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Vulnerability of Microfinance to Strategic Default and Covariate Shocks: 
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This paper investigates the repayment behavior of microfinance borrowers in Pakistan using a unique 
dataset of about 45,000 installments/repayments covering 2,945 microfinance borrower households over 
the period 1998–2007. In early 2005, the microfinance institution for these borrowers adopted a new 
system with strict enforcement of punishment against repayment delays/defaults. This reform led to a 
healthy situation with almost zero default rates, overcoming the previous problem of frequent defaults. 
We hypothesize that strategic default under the joint liability mechanism—if one group member is hit by 
a negative shock and faces difficulty in repayment, the other members who are able to repay may decide 
to default as well, instead of helping the unlucky member—was encouraged by weak enforcement of 
dynamic incentives and responsible for the pre-reform failure. As evidence for this interpretation, we 
show that a borrower’s delay in installment repayment was correlated with other group members’ 
repayment delays, beyond the level explained by possible correlation of project failures due to locally 
covariate shocks during the pre-reform period. The post-reform period is divided into two sub-periods by 
an earthquake in October 2005. Analysis of repayment behavior in the post-reform period yields the 
results that suggest that (1) the relative success under the new system was because of the suppression of 
strategic behavior among group members, thereby allowing joint liability schemes to function as 
individual lending schemes de facto and (2) the earthquake only marginally affected the new system in 
terms of repayment delays. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper empirically analyzes the repayment behavior of microfinance borrowers who were 
subject to high levels of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks and to subsequent reforms in the contract 
design concerning repayment installments and dynamic incentives. In the literature on microfinance, 
mechanisms that led to the success of Grameen Bank in maintaining high repayment rates have been the 
focus of research (Aghion and Morduch, 2010). While the first generation studies emphasize on various 
aspects of the role of joint liability in group lending, such as peer selection (Ghatak, 1999; 2000), peer 
monitoring (Stiglitz, 1990; Varian, 1990; Banerjee et al., 1994), and peer enforcement (Besley and Coate, 
1995; Armendariz de Aghion, 1999), there has been a shift in emphasis in the second generation studies. 
Aghion and Morduch (2010) argue that joint liability is only one factor contributing to successful 
microfinance schemes and that there are other important aspects such as sequential financing, contingent 
renewal, dynamic incentives, frequent repayment installments, and public repayments.
1 Chowdhury 
(2005) theoretically shows that without sequential financing, group-lending schemes may suffer from 
under-monitoring, which might lead to borrowers investing in risky projects. In another theoretical paper, 
Chowdhury (2007) outlines that contingent renewal alone can resolve the moral hazard problem only 
when the discount rate is relatively low; however, a combination of sequential financing and contingent 
renewal can be successful even when the discount rate is relatively high. 
The analysis of different theoretical mechanisms in literature notwithstanding, empirical evidence 
on the effectiveness of each continues to be limited,
2  although it has seen an increase in recent times 
(Hermes and Lensink, 2007). Kono (2006) reports the results of the Vietnamese experiment with 
microfinance games wherein contract designs are varied, and shows that joint liability per se leads to 
more frequent strategic default. Using the field experiment approach, Gine and Karlan (2009) evaluate the 
impact of removing group liability in the Philippines and find no adverse impact on repayment as long as 
public and frequent repayment systems are maintained.
3  At the same time, few empirical studies use 
non-experimental data while attempting to establish an explicit theoretical link. Using data from Peru, 
1Sequential financing refers to group loans that are staggered within the same round. Contingent renewal means the 
exclusion of defaulting borrowers from future access to loans. Dynamic incentives refer to provision for larger loans 
to borrowers who successfully repay. Contingent renewal and dynamic incentives in this sense are sometimes 
combined as dynamic incentives in the broad sense. Public repayments refer to a system where borrowers make 
repayments to loan officers visiting villages in presence of others.
2The focus here is on empirical studies that attempt to establish an explicit link to theories. There are a large number 
of empirical and insightful studies that estimate the reduced-form determinants of group repayment behavior among 
microfinance borrowers (e.g., Hermes et al., 2005; Kritikos and Vigenina, 2005; Godquin, 2004; Paxton et al., 2000; 
Wydick, 1999; Sharma and Zeller, 1997). Among these, Wydick (1999) is one of the more influential ones as it 
employs the most extensive list of proxy variables to measure screening, monitoring, and enforcement within 
groups. 
3See Cassar et al. (2007), McIntosh (2008), and Field and Pande (2008) for other applications of the experiment 
approach to analyze the mechanism underlying the repayment behavior. 
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Karlan (2007) finds evidence for the existence of peer monitoring under joint liability. Using data from 
Thailand, Ahlin and Townsend (2007) test theoretical models of joint liability lending, showing that the 
joint liability rate negatively affects repayment while the strength of local sanctions positively affects 
repayment. Interestingly, they show that the Besley and Coate model of strategic default has low 
explanatory power in general but that its explanatory power increases when applied to poor, 
low-infrastructure areas. These studies mostly support the view that mechanisms such as sequential 
financing, contingent renewal, dynamic incentives, frequent repayment, and public repayments are more 
important than joint liability is to the success of microfinance lending. However, they do not provide 
detailed empirical evidence for each theoretical mechanism, especially regarding the intra-group 
repayment dynamics that plays a key role in each model. More recently, Ahlin (2009) tests risk-matching 
and intra-group diversification of risk using Thai data and finds evidence of homogeneous sorting by risk 
and risk anti-diversification within groups. 
To extend the empirical research in this direction, this paper investigates a unique dataset of about 
45,000 installments/repayments covering 2,945 borrower households in Pakistan over the period 
1998–2007, in order to offer empirical evidence that (1) strategic default is a serious problem for 
microfinance and (2) contingent renewal is a prerequisite for joint liability to prevent strategic default. 
Modern-style microfinance took root in Pakistan in the late 1990s; since then, there have been several 
examples of microfinance schemes that have failed despite following a group lending design on the lines 
of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. Our dataset is unique not only in its level of disaggregation but also in 
its time coverage, which includes two important events. First, in early 2005, contract designs were 
changed to stress on improved enforcement of contingent renewal and more frequent repayment 
installments. Our dataset includes this break and enables us to analyze the outcome of contract design 
changes regarding repayment behavior. The second event occurred in October 2005 when a disastrous 
earthquake measuring 7.6 on the Richter scale struck Pakistan, killing more than 70,000 people. An 
earthquake is a strong covariate and an unexpected natural shock. Sample borrowers in our dataset lived 
in a radius ranging between 40 and 110 km from the epicenter. Therefore, our dataset enables us to 
analyze the impacts of covariate shocks of a high magnitude, whose impact on microfinance finds little 
mention in the literature (Shoji, 2010; Becchetti and Castriota, 2008). 
Our analysis of the installment-level dynamics of repayment delays shows that a type of strategic 
default under the joint liability mechanism—wherein if one group member is hit by a negative shock and 
faces difficulty in repayment, other members who are capable of repayment may decide to default 
themselves as well, instead of helping out the unlucky member—was encouraged by weak enforcement of 
the contingent renewal rule. We ascribe the pre-2005 failure to this type of default. The delay in the 
unlucky member’s repayment of each installment was correlated with other members’ repayment delays 
3 
 
         
       
 
     
     
     
       
         
     
       
   
 
 
   
 
       
         
 
     
 
         
 
         
       
   
     
     
       
             
       
         
beyond the level explained by the possible correlation of project failures due to locally covariate shocks. 
Although this type of strategic default has been shown to exist theoretically (e.g., Besley and Coate, 1995; 
Bhole and Ogden, 2010), this paper provides the empirical evidence lacking in the literature. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical model to guide our 
empirical investigation. Section 3 describes the dataset and its background, providing the empirical 
definition of default and repayment delay adopted in this paper. Section 4 investigates the determinants of 
loan default and repayment delay under the old system at the borrower level, in order to show that the 
2005 reforms were a step in the right direction. Section 5 documents the bulk of our empirical analysis, in 
which we examine the dynamics of installment repayments for loans made under the old system. Section 
6 extends the analyses to loans made under the new system to show the decline in strategic default and 
demonstrate that the earthquake only marginally affected the new system in terms of repayment delays. 
Section 7 presents the conclusions. 
2  A Theoretical Model of Group Lending with Imperfect Joint Liability 
2.1  Overview 
Joint liability or group liability can be defined as the mechanism wherein all group members are 
collectively responsible for loans made to group members in a manner such that all members lose their 
future access to loans if at least one borrower in the group fails to repay. In the first generation 
microfinance research, this mechanism was considered as the principal contributor to the success of 
Grameen Bank. Theoretical predictions show that the joint liability rule encourages peer selection 
(Ghatak, 1999; 2000), peer monitoring of project choice or efforts (Stiglitz, 1990; Varian, 1990; Banerjee 
et al., 1994), and peer enforcement with an aim to avoid strategic default (Besley and Coate, 1995; 
Armendariz de Aghion, 1999; Bhole and Ogden, 2010), which in turn may contribute to improved 
repayment rates among poor and collateral-less borrowers. At the same time, these theoretical studies also 
show that there might be a possibility of joint liability leading to high default rates, depending on 
structural parameters. 
By construction, most of the abovementioned studies allow only two states: collective repayment 
or collective default. In order to simulate real life scenarios wherein even under joint liability schemes 
some members default while others in the same group repay their dues (but do not repay the dues of their 
defaulting peers), the assumption of perfect joint liability needs to be abandoned. We therefore extend a 
version (without social sanctions) of the repayment game proposed by Besley and Coate (1995), 
hereinafter referred to as the BC model, in order to allow the option of a group member repaying his/her 
due only. The BC model shows that borrowers who would repay under individual liability may not do so 
under group liability if they realize that they cannot repay as a group. 
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In this section, we build an extended model of repayment under imperfect joint liability to show 
that “peer correlation,” which is the focus of the empirical analysis of this paper, reflects the intra-group 
interaction of borrowers. Models in the existing literature on group lending, however, cannot show this 
because the enforcement of joint liability is typically assumed to be perfect, which implies that repayment 
delay or default within a borrowers’ group should be perfectly correlated. By assuming imperfect joint 
liability, we investigate the comparative statics of peer correlation with respect to the degrees of 
enforcement of the contingent renewal and the joint liability rules. The extended model predicts that 
strategic default may occur under imperfect joint liability. Under imperfect joint liability, “within-group 
cooperation” (a borrower who would not repay under individual liability is helped by another member to 
repay the debt) rarely occurs. 
2.2  The  model 
There are two ex ante identical borrowers, each of whom has a project that requires one unit of 
capital. The project yields θ units of income. Before undertaking the project, the borrowers do not know θ 
but know that θ is distributed on [θ
min, θ
max] according to the distribution function F(θ). Assuming the two 
borrowers form a borrowers’ group, the bank lends each borrower one unit of capital, which is due at the 
end of the period with the amount to be repaid at the gross interest factor at r (>1). If both borrowers 
repay, each obtains the payoff of θi – r, i = 1, 2 (the borrowers are assumed to be risk-neutral). These are 
exactly the same assumptions as those in the BC model. 
If neither of the borrowers repay, each obtains the payoff of θi – πp(θi), where p(.) is the penalty 
on the defaulting borrowers, which is assumed to be increasing in θ. One way of justifying p’(.)>0 is that 
the main penalty is the loss of future access to microfinance loans and the net gain from having 
microfinance access increases in the realized value of θ. As in the BC model, the inverse of the penalty 
function p(.) is denoted by the function φ(.) ( ≡ p
-1(.)). An additional parameter π is not included in the BC 
model. It is a fixed parameter in the range [0, 1] that captures the level of enforcement of the contingent 
renewal rule. By the contingent renewal rule, we refer to the mechanism analyzed by Chowdhury (2007), 
i.e., borrowers maintain their future loan access contingent on full repayment of their current loans. This 
rule is a prerequisite for dynamic incentives to function in the narrow sense (borrowers who have 
successfully repaid will be given a larger amount of credit). In reality, this rule may not be enforced 
strictly. We thus assume that the defaulters will maintain their future loan access with a probability of 
1–π.
4 
4In the context of strategic default, Armendariz de Aghion (1999) shows a theoretical model in which the probability 
of penalty lies in the range [0, 1], which corresponds to π in our model. In her model, this parameter is chosen by the 




   
 
   
           
     
 
     
 
         
     
       
             
     
       
         
             
       
                   
   
   
       
     
 
   
         
       
                                                                                                                                                                               
     
 
     
       
   
     
   
 
If borrower i repays his/her due (but does not repay his/her partner’s due
5) and borrower j defaults, 
the payoff for the former is θi – r – γπp(θi), and that for the latter is θj – πp(θj), where γ is a fixed 
parameter in the range [0, 1] that captures the level of enforcement of the joint liability rule. By the joint 
liability rule, we refer to the rule that all non-default members lose their future loan access if at least one 
borrower in the borrowers’ group fails to repay the current loan. In reality, this rule may not be enforced 
strictly. We assume that the peer of the defaulting borrower may maintain his/her future loan access with 
a probability of 1–γ. 
In accordance with the BC model, we consider the extensive form game depicted in Figure 1. At 
the time the game is played, the returns from both borrowers’ projects are assumed to have been realized. 
These returns are denoted by θ1 and θ2 and are assumed to be common knowledge within the group. In the 
first stage of the game, both borrowers decide simultaneously whether to contribute their shares. The two 
options are labeled as c (contribute) and n (not contribute). If both borrowers make the same decision, the 
outcome is straightforward: either both repay their individual dues or both default. 
However, if the borrowers choose different strategies in the first stage, then the borrower who has 
played c now has to choose from three options: GR (repay the total group dues), IR (repay individual dues 
only), or D (default). The second choice of IR is our addition to the BC model. The payoffs for various 
combinations of strategies are shown in the bottom rows of Figure 1. For example, if borrower 1 plays n 
and borrower 2 plays c in the first stage, borrower 2 gets to choose from three options, resulting in one of 
the following payoffs: θ2 – 2r (playing GR), θ2 – r – γπp(θ2) (playing IR), or θ2 – πp(θ2) (playing D). 
The choice of each borrower depends on the realization of (θ1, θ2) and the level of enforcement of 
the rules characterized by (π, γ). As in the BC model, the extensive form of the game outlined in Figure 1 
has many Nash equilibria. Therefore, following the BC model, we use subgame perfection to refine these 
and assume that the borrowers can achieve the Pareto-superior equilibrium if there are two equilibria of 
mutual contribution and mutual non-contribution. 
2.3  Characterization  of  the  solution 
Using Figure 1, we search for the Pareto-superior subgame perfect equilibria. Our model is a 
generalization of the BC model in the sense that it becomes an individual lending model if γ = 0 and a 
contingent renewal rule does not occur. In our model, we assume that the lender cannot enforce the rule with a 
probability of 1 because of enforcement inability.
5Following Besley and Coate (1995), we assume that in order to avoid joint liability penalty, a non-defaulting 
borrower needs to fully repay his/her defaulting partner’s dues. Armendariz de Aghion (1999) shows that the lender 
optimally chooses the full repayment of the defaulting peer even when he/she can choose a fraction of it. Her 
theoretical result justifies our assumption. On the other hand, Bhole and Ogden (2010) show that allowing partial 
liability improves the efficiency of a flexible group lending scheme. Allowing for partial liability in our model is left 
for further study. 
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joint liability model if γ = 1. If γ = 0, the player who chooses c in the first stage does not choose GR in the 
second stage since the payoff under GR is always smaller than that under IR. In other words, when γ = 0, 
the choice of GR is always dominated by the choice of IR. Therefore, this situation is equivalent to the 
individual lending model analyzed by Besley and Coate (1995). The resulting pattern of equilibria is 
shown in Figure 2. In the top right region, both borrowers repay; in the bottom left, both default; in the 
top left, borrower 1 defaults; and in the bottom right, borrower 2 defaults. 
Similarly, if γ = 1, the player who chooses c in the first stage does not choose IR in the second 
stage since the payoff under IR is always smaller than that under D. In other words, when γ = 1, the 
choice of IR is always dominated by the choice of D. Therefore, this situation is equivalent to the 
without-social-sanctions case analyzed by Besley and Coate (1995). When γ > 1/2, the pattern of 
equilibria is the same as that in the BC model. The resulting pattern of equilibria is shown in Figure 3. In 
the top right region where θ1 > φ(2r/π) and θ2 > φ(2r/π), we observe that the group dues are repaid 
successfully. However, this is achieved by the non-symmetric equilibria of either {(c, GR), n} or {n, (c, 
GR)}. As explained by Besley and Coate (1995), since both borrowers have lucrative projects that make it 
possible for either to repay the group loan unilaterally, {c, c} cannot be an equilibrium. When {(c, GR), 
n} is achieved as the equilibrium, for instance, borrower 2 free-rides on borrower 1’s decision to repay 
the group dues. This is one case of strategic default predicted in the BC model. In contrast, in the middle 
portion where φ(r/π) < θi  < φ(2r/π), i = 1, 2, loans are successfully repaid as in the top right region 
without any free riding, i.e., both borrowers repay their dues. Another case of strategic default predicted 
in the BC model occurs when θ1 < φ(r/π) and φ(r/π) < θ2 < φ(2r/π) or when θ2 < φ(r/π) and φ(r/π) < θ1 < 
φ(2r/π). In this case, under individual liability, the relatively favored borrower repays while the other 
defaults, but the joint liability drives the relatively favored borrower to default as well.
6 
When γ < 1/2, it is possible to encounter a situation as shown in Figure 4. In four top-right 
regions where θ1 > φ(r/π) and θ2 > φ(r/π), loans are repaid successfully by the group. Since the rule of 
joint liability is not strong enough, in no case does one borrower repay the group dues while the other 
repays nothing. This is in sharp contrast to the prediction made in the BC model’s prediction. For instance, 
when  θ1 < φ(r/π) and θ2 > φ(2r/π), or when θ2 < φ(r/π) and θ1 > φ(2r/π), the BC model predicts 
within-group cooperation (a borrower who would not repay under individual liability is helped by another 
member to repay the debt), while our model predicts that such cooperation cannot be achieved because γ 
is not large enough. On the other hand, the second case of strategic default predicted in the BC model is 
replicated in our model. See the two regions in Figure 4 where θ1 < φ(r/π) and φ(r/π) < θ2 < φ(2r/π) or 
when θ2 < φ(r/π) and φ(r/π) < θ1 < φ(2r/π). The incomplete joint liability model predicts group default ({n, 
6This may be avoided if informal social sanctions are effective. See Besley and Coate (1995). 
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n}). In this paper, we focus on this type of strategic default, wherein a borrower who would repay under 
individual liability does not do so under group liability if he/she realizes that they cannot repay as a 
group. 
When  γ is sufficiently small, the type of strategic default outlined above (without group 
cooperation) does not occur and the pure individual liability mechanism prevails. The threshold value is 
determined by the equality γ = 1 – r/{πp(θi)}, which is increasing with π. 
2.4  Comparative statics analysis of peer correlation with respect to the degree of rule 
enforcement 
Figure 5 shows the possible regimes under different combinations of (π, γ). Of the four segments 
in the figure, the left segment is characterized by very low enforcement of the contingent renewal rule (π 
is low), resulting in a situation where loans are not repaid. In this area, peer correlation is not defined. 
The bottom right region is characterized by low enforcement of the joint liability rule (γ is low), 
resulting in a situation where the pure individual liability mechanism prevails. Borrower 1 defaults if θ1 < 
φ(r/π) and borrower 2 defaults if θ2 < φ(r/π), as shown in Figure 2. Therefore, if individual projects in the 
same borrowers’ group are independent, the peer correlation coefficient is zero. If individual project risks 
are locally covariate, then peer correlation purely reflects this covariance.
7 
The top right region is characterized by high values of γ, resulting in a situation where IR is never 
chosen in the second stage of the repayment game. Under this regime, we observe two cases depending 
on the realization of (θ1, θ2): Both loans are repaid or neither of the loans is repaid, as shown in Figure 3. 
Therefore, regardless of the correlation of individual projects in the same borrowers’ group, the peer 
correlation coefficient is unity. 
The middle right region characterized by middle values of γ is the area of interest. In this case, we 
never come across a situation where the whole group dues are repaid by one of the two group members. 
When group dues are paid successfully, both borrowers pay their individual dues. On the other hand, if 
we look at situations where loans are not repaid at all, we find cases in which a borrower who would 
repay under individual liability does not do so because of the weak but non-negligible group liability. In 
Figure 5, such cases fall in the “GR-IR mixed region,” wherein individual repayment behavior dominates 
in case of payment of dues, while group repayment behavior dominates in case of default. Because of the 
latter effect, the peer correlation coefficient is strictly between 0 and 1 when individual project risks are 
independent. The level of peer correlation reflects the frequency of strategic defaults. 
7See Armendariz de Aghion (1999) for the theoretical impact of the covariance of intra-group microfinance returns 
on repayment when strategic default occurs, and see Ahlin and Townsend (2008) for an example of empirical 
modeling of the covariance. 
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On the basis of this argument, the peer correlation coefficient is expected to increase with γ. This 
expectation is confirmed numerically in the case where θ1 and θ2 are jointly distributed as an independent 
uniform distribution in the range [θ
min , θ
max]. 
The impact of π on the peer correlation coefficient depends on the level of γ. We investigate the 
, θ
max]. case where θ1 and θ2 are jointly distributed as an independent uniform distribution in the range [θ
min 
If initially γ is low enough for the situation to fall in the middle right region while the new situation falls 
in the bottom right region (a move from point A to A' in Figure 5), the peer correlation coefficient should 
decline. On the other hand, if both the initial and new points are located in the middle right region (a 
move from point B to B' in Figure 5), the sign of the change in the peer correlation coefficient is 
indeterminate. Our numerical results indicate that the change in the coefficient is negative when γ is low 
and the change is positive above a threshold value of γ. 
Our strategic default model thus predicts that better enforcement of the contingent renewal rule 
will result in lower default rates and a lower level of peer correlation because of the less frequent 
occurrence of strategic defaults. On the other hand, most models focusing on adverse selection or moral 
hazard predict the opposite. For example, if the joint liability model solves the adverse selection problem 
through assortative matching (Ghatak, 1999; 2000), in the imperfect joint liability model, project 
outcomes are uncorrelated when individual projects’ returns are uncorrelated since there is little 
assortative matching. At the same time, in a model with improved joint liability, more peer correlation 
and fewer defaults are observed, owing to the high prevalence of assortative matching.
8 This is exactly 
the opposite of the predictions made in the model derived in this section. In the following sections we 
show that the empirical characteristics found in Pakistani data are more consistent with the strategic 
default model where π increases with γ remaining almost constant at a low level, than they are with other 
models. 
3  Data  and  Background 
3.1  Microfinance in Pakistan 
Pakistan is one of the low income countries in South Asia where poverty is rampant and the 
majority of the poor face difficulties in getting access to efficient sources of credit (World Bank, 2002). 
Microfinance is still relatively new to Pakistan, both from a conceptual and a practical point of view. The 
country is among the largest potential microfinance markets in the world with a conservative estimate of 
the potential borrower base at 10 million adults. This figure is likely to expand dramatically given 
Pakistan’s high population growth rate. 
8See Ahlin (2009) for other theoretical models on borrowers’ risk matching. 
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Modern-style microfinance in Pakistan began only in the late 1990s. At that time, the main 
providers of microfinance were NGOs and government-supported rural support networks. Microfinance 
was declared a priority in the official Poverty Alleviation Strategy in 1999 and a regulatory framework for 
the promotion of microfinance was established in 2001. The result was a massive investment of at least 
US$400 million in the period 1999–2005, largely from multilateral sources such as the World Bank and 
the Asian Development Bank. Among the various microfinance providers today, Khushhali Bank, the 
flagship institution established by the Pakistani government in 2000, served more clients than the 
collective client base of all the NGOs and rural support programs before 2001 (Montgomery, 2005). 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Pakistan now comprise a voluntary network called Pakistan 
Microfinance Network (PMN). With the passage of time, the country has not only moved forward but 
also benefited from the experience of countries that were ahead of it on the microfinance front. However, 
it must be said that although the impact of microfinance services in Pakistan has been positive, their 
outreach has been limited, with many of the poor untouched by them (Montgomery, 2005). 
During the 1990s, the economy of Pakistan registered moderate growth; however, due to rising 
economic inequality, poverty did not decline proportionately (World Bank, 2002). The macroeconomic 
scene in the country has not changed much during the 2000s as far as macroeconomic indicators are 
concerned. Because of the lack of sustained high growth, the absolute level of real per capita income is 
still very low, standing at US$2,678 in 2008 after PPP adjustment (UNDP, 2010). In this backdrop, 
transferring the benefit of growth equitably across board, especially among the poor, remains a challenge. 
3.2  Primary data of microcredit borrowers and their repayment 
We utilize micro-level information maintained for the purpose of financial monitoring of 
microcredit intervention. The information is obtained from a member of PMN. The names and identities 
of the participating households are replaced by computer-generated numbers to safeguard privacy. The 
sample is taken from a district in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP),
9  Pakistan, which was 
severely affected by the earthquake. Four primary datasets were collected in August 2006 and 
subsequently updated in July 2009. They were converted into a pooled cross-sectional dataset for 
empirical analysis. 
(1) Borrowers’ Data: There are 2,950 borrowers in this dataset collected in August 2006, 
comprising those who borrowed between May 1, 1998, and July 8, 2006. Since installment and repayment 
9  In April 2010, the constitution of Pakistan was amended and the former NWFP was renamed “Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa.” In this paper, since all data correspond to a period before this constitutional amendment, the 




   
       
     
         
     
     
     
     
 
     
   
   
 
   
 
   
         
       
   
     
         
           
       
   
   
                                                       
   
     
 
   
   
   
   
records were missing for five borrowers in this dataset,
10  we analyzed 2,945 borrowers in this paper. 
Approximately 30% of the borrowers are females. Information regarding the household to which the 
borrower belonged was collected and made part of the borrower dataset. 
(2) Data on Borrowers’ Community Organizations: To be eligible for microfinance loans in the 
study area, borrowers need to form a community organization (CO) with joint liability. Information of 
COs to which the above borrowers belonged was collected. There are 870 COs in the CO dataset, 
comprising those established between March 11, 1997, and April 10, 2006. Female borrowers usually 
belonged to COs designated as “female COs,” which accounted for 22.4% of the sample COs. COs 
maintain their own savings account, with the balance ranging from Rs.0 to Rs.99,000 and the average 
being Rs.6,348.
11 
(3) Data on Installments: For each borrower, records were kept for each installment, such as due 
date, amounts due as principal and as service charges or process fee,
12  installment repaid, and outstanding 
debt after repayment. For the 2,945 borrowers in the borrower dataset, there are 44,931 installment 
records. Their due dates range from June 1, 1998 to October 2, 2007. 
(4) Data on Repayment Receipts: When a borrower repays, a receipt is issued and relevant 
information such as the time and amount of repayment and the amount of penalty is recorded in this 
dataset. To the 2,945 borrowers in the borrower dataset, 32,695 receipts were issued. The receipts are 
dated between June 5, 1998 (the first repayment in our sample was made four days after the due date) to 
October 22, 2007 (the last repayment in our sample was made 20 days after the due date). 
The number of receipt-level observations is considerably smaller than that of installment-level 
observations for two reasons. First, some installments were not repaid—clear cases of default. Second, 
when the borrowers paid amounts more than the amounts due in an installment, one receipt was issued. 
To reduce the transaction costs of monthly repayment, many borrowers preferred to pay a single 
installment worth several months’ amount at one go. On the other hand, when the borrower could not pay 
a monthly installment, he/she often repaid the amount worth two months’ dues in the following month. 
All installment dues associated with loans provided after January 2005 were already repaid by the time 
the dataset was updated in July 2009. Therefore, the right-censoring problem for installments is not a 
10These borrowers obtained loans on October 6, 2005, two days before the earthquake.
 
11In this paper, “Rs.” refers to nominal Pakistani rupees. The exchange rate between Pakistani rupees and US dollars
 
was stable at around Rs.60/$ during the study period. The government estimates for inflation rates inside Pakistan
 
were in the range from 3.1 to 7.9% per annum.

12Under Islamic law, no interest is charged on microfinance loans but borrowers have to pay service charges or
 
process fee in addition to the principal. In effect, these charges are equivalent to interest (the interest rate charged on 




       
   
 
 
     
 
     
 
   
       
                 
       
         
 
       
     
     
 
     
   
 
     
       
         
         
   
     
   
                                                       
     
 




There are two important time breaks in our data. First, from January 2, 2005, the MFI began to 
provide microcredit under a new system offering improved accountability. The last loan under the old 
system was issued on October 4, 2003. There was a gap of more than 13 months without new loans, 
during which period the MFI continued to collect dues from old loans while it formulated a new system. 
The second time break occurred on October 8, 2005, when Pakistan was hit by a severe earthquake. 
3.3  Reforms in January 2005 
There are a number of differences in the contract characteristics of microfinance loans issued 
under the old and new systems (Table 1). First, the average loan size was almost halved. It was Rs.16,300 
(about US$270) under the old system and Rs.9,000 (about US$150) under the new system. This drop is 
attributable to the drop in the minimum allowable amount of a standard loan from Rs.10,000 to Rs.5,000 
and to the abolishment of loans exceeding Rs.15,000 under the new system. 
Second, the number of installments and length of credit duration decreased by 25%. Under the 
old system, there were several types of loans on offer. The most common was a 19-month loan to be 
repaid in 18 monthly installments (42.3% of the sample), followed by a 31-month loan to be repaid in 30 
monthly installments (18.3%). Approximately 8.3% of the sample loans were not to be repaid monthly 
but in a single installment with the loan period of 6, 9, 12, or 18 months. Under the new system, only two 
standard types of loans were offered: a 12-month loan to be repaid in 12 monthly installments or a 
15-month loan to be repaid in 15 monthly installments. The first type accounted for 92.3% of the sample, 
and the second type 7.2% (there are three exceptional cases where the loans were repaid in a single 
installment one month after the loan was issued). 
The third change between the two systems was that interests (service charges) for all loans were 
collected in advance as processing fee under the new system, whereas under the old system, service 
charges were collected over the repayment period along with the principal in each installment. In addition, 
under the old system, there was a grace period of one month before repayment began. This one-month 
grace period was abandoned under the new system. 
The fourth change pertained to the enforcement of penalty against non-repayment. Under the old 
system, there was a rule that no new loans would be given to a borrower unless his/her entire group repaid. 
However, the rule was not enforced stringently. The new system promised better accountability, which 
called for stricter enforcement of the non-repayment rule. This positive change is reflected in Table 1: 
13Our dataset updated in July 2009 includes information for those borrowers who borrowed after our initial data 
collection in August 2006 and were still in the repayment schedule in July 2009. To avoid the right-censoring 
problem, this paper employs the subset of our dataset that corresponds only to the borrowers included in the initial 
data collected in August 2006. 
12 
 
   
     
         
   
   
       
   
 
     
     
   
       
   
       
       
                   
     
           
   
         
 
             
         
         
   
       
     
     
         
       
     
 
 
Under the new system, the ratio of borrowers with a national identity information record (NIC 
information) is 100%. Additionally, the ratio of female borrowers also increased under the new system. 
The fifth change involved linking development projects at the community level with repayment 
rates of COs in the region. In Pakistan, several initiatives were introduced in the 2000s to strengthen 
community-based development (Kurosaki, 2005). Under the new system, the implementation of 
infrastructure or human resource development projects became contingent on the repayment record of the 
community. This change is another example of improved dynamic incentives for repayment. 
3.4  Earthquake in October 2005 
The second time break in our dataset is demarcated on October 8, 2005. On this day, an 
earthquake measuring 7.6 on the Richter scale rocked Kashmir. The calamity caused widespread 
destruction and heavy loss to human life, killing at least 73,000 people, severely injuring another 70,000, 
and leaving 2.8 million people homeless. Social service delivery, commerce, and communications were 
either severely weakened or destroyed. Beyond the human toll, the overall cost of the earthquake was 
staggering. A joint damage and needs assessment by a group of experts from Asian Development Bank 
and World Bank put the value of direct damage due to the earthquake at US$2.3 billion, resulting indirect 
losses at US$576 million, and estimated the total costs for relief, livelihood support for victims, and 
reconstruction cost at approximately US$5.2 billion (Asian Development Bank and World Bank, 2005). 
The earthquake also adversely affected the macroeconomy, particularly the fiscal deficit. The 
overall fiscal deficit as a percentage of the GDP rose by about 1% point after the earthquake. Given the 
magnitude of resources needed for the rehabilitation of earthquake-affected areas, the government was not 
able to fully absorb the fiscal impact of the earthquake without significantly compromising on public 
sector development. Therefore, the poor in areas not affected by the disaster (i.e., the vast majority of the 
poor in Pakistan) were adversely affected as well on account of increased allocation of public resources to 
the earthquake-affected areas at the expense of the rest of the country. 
The characteristics of borrowers and loan contracts under the new system are shown in Table 1. 
Figures corresponding to borrowers who were issued loans before the earthquake are indicated separately 
from those issued loans after. Overall, however, both sets of figures show close similarity. None of the 
variables in Table 1 showed statistically significant differences except the ratio of borrowers with income 
sources outside the region. Table 1 thus proves that the critical change pertaining to the characteristics of 




     
   
         
     
         
     
 
       
       
   
 
   
     
         
           
 
         
         
   
     
 
   
       
           
     
     
     
     
   
                                                       
     
 
     
 
   
     
   
3.5  Data compilation for loan default and repayment delay 
From the primary data described above, we compile several variables for loan default and 
repayment delay, since these are the two pressing concerns of the MFI (Table 2). Aggregating the number 
of loans fully repaid by the time of our survey, we obtain the borrower-level variable Default, which is 
plotted in Figure 6. As can be seen clearly from the figure, all the 670 borrowers under the new system 
repaid fully (Default  = 0). In contrast, out of 2,275 old borrowers, only 1,119 had completed the 
repayment by the time of our survey, implying a default rate of 50.8% (Table 2).
14 
In Figure 6, the predicted probability from a probit model is also plotted for samples under the old 
system, in which Default was regressed on the date of loan issue and its polynomials. Polynomials of the 
fifth order and above did not have statistically significant coefficients. The default rates show a highly 
nonlinear pattern over the period. 
The default rate for the old loans, nevertheless, underestimates the cost for the MFI because some 
bad loans were repaid much after the last due date. For instance, in our sample, a borrower who obtained 
a credit of Rs.25,000 on May 7, 1998, had paid only about two-thirds of his/her due by November 7, 1999 
(the due date of the last installment) and paid the rest on July 19, 2001. Such cases are not counted as 
defaults. 
Therefore, in order to accurately measure the quality of repayment by the 1,119 borrowers with 
Default = 0, a variable named Avg_delay, i.e., the average delay in days of repayment relative to the due 
date for each installment, was calculated. Table 2 shows the average of Avg_delay for the 1,119 
borrowers at 100.0 days, ranging from -552.0 to 1014.0 (standard deviation [SD] at 145). If we exclude 5 
outliers who made early repayment (Avg_delay < -200) and 4 outliers who made very late repayment 
(Avg_delay > 1000), the average of Avg_delay becomes 98.5 (SD = 131.6).
15 
Similar variables can be defined at the installment level. The first one, No_repay, is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one when the installment is not paid. For installments that are paid, 
another variable Delay (delay in days of repayment from the due date for the installment) is computed. In 
addition to these two, a third variable, Problem, is a dummy variable assuming the value of one if the 
installment is not repaid within 31 days from the due date. Since early repayment is not a concern for 
MFIs, the variable Problem ignores early repayments. Since late repayment and no repayment are 
concerns for MFIs, Problem aggregates the late and no repayment information into one variable. As 
14For loans provided under the old system, the due date of the last installment for the 2,275 borrowers ranged from 
July 7, 1999, to October 4, 2004. Given that our data was collected more than 57 months after the last of these due 
dates, it is safe to ignore the possibility of future repayments. Therefore, the right-censoring problem for the old 
loans can be ignored.
15The borrower with Avg_delay at -552 borrowed Rs.20,000 on September 2, 2002; this amount was due on April 2, 
2004, without installments. However, since the borrower repaid the entire amount on September 28, 2002, i.e., 552 




     
     
   
   
             
         
   
 
       
     
 
   
 
 
   
 
   
     
           
 
     
   
         
     
     
                                                       
   
             
     
   
     
     
   
 
shown in Table 2, all three variables have very high average values for loans provided under the old 
system. About 21% of all installments were never repaid, the average delay of repaid installments was 
about 101 days, and 65% of all installments suffered from late repayment or non-repayment. 
In sharp contrast, for all 670 borrowers under the new system, Default = 0 and No_repay = 0 
(Table 2), whether the loan was made before or after the earthquake. We calculate Avg_delay, Delay, and 
Problem for for these borrowers as well. The average of Avg_delay and that of Delay are slightly negative 
before the earthquake and slightly positive after the earthquake, suggesting the possibility that the 
earthquake led to more delays (3.4 days on average) in repayment. However, a simple t test of the equal 
means cannot reject the null hypothesis that the means are the same. Therefore, it appears that no serious 
delay occurred under the new system and the adverse impact of the earthquake was not statistically 
significant.
16  However, to confirm this conclusion, a multivariate regression is conducted in Section 6. 
4  Why Did the Old System Fail? A Borrower-Level Analysis 
4.1  Empirical  models 
At the outset of our analysis, we investigate the determinants of loan default and repayment delay 
under the old system. Two dependent variables—Default and Avg_delay—and four groups of explanatory 
variables are employed. 
1. Borrowers’ characteristics (including those of the household to which the borrower belonged): 
gender, family type, income sources, physical conditions of the house, status in the borrowers’ group, etc. 
2. Credit characteristics: amount of credit, number of installments, period of credit in months, etc. 
3. CO characteristics: number of CO members, value of CO savings, age of the CO when the loan 
was issued, etc. 
4. Location and time effects: time effects and union fixed effects. 
Regarding group 4, unobservable heterogeneity that is specific to a region is controlled by union 
fixed effects.
17  Unobservable macro effects are controlled by the date of issue of each loan. In one 
specification, D_issue (measured in the number of days elapsed since May 1, 1998) and its higher order 
polynomials are adopted. In another specification, year dummies corresponding to the date of issue are 
16All five borrowers whose repayment records were completely missing belonged to the same borrower group and 
borrowed just two days before the earthquake. They lived in an area 106 km from the epicenter of the earthquake. 
With these five borrowers added to the list of repayment delays or defaults, the adverse impact of the earthquake on 
repayment would have been slightly more serious than what is indicated in Table 2.
17In Pakistan, a union is the smallest administrative unit that comes under the jurisdiction of the union council. 
Usually, 10–20 villages make a single union council. Although there are 47 union councils in the dataset, only 9 had 
multiple borrowers’ groups. Therefore, we compiled union dummies for these nine councils and merged the 
remaining councils into one category of “small unions.” Union fixed effects in the regression analyses below 
correspond to these 10 dummies. 
15 
 
     
           
 
   
       
 
   
   
       
   
   
     
     
   
   




     
       
         
   
   
     
             
   
 
     
     
       
       
     
         
included. As shown in Figure 6, no monotonic trend is observed between Default and D_issue under the 
old system, but some fluctuations exist over time. Therefore, controlling macro effects in a flexible 
manner is important. 
There are several selection problems in investigating the reduced-form determinants focusing on 
these explanatory variables. First, Avg_delay is defined only when Default=0. To control for this selection 
bias, we adopted Heckman’s two-step procedure. Second, contract type is not randomly chosen but is 
partly decided by the borrowers themselves. Therefore, if we do not control for this self-selection, the 
coefficients on the credit characteristics listed above cannot be interpreted as showing the causal effects 
of contract design on repayment (Aghion and Morduch, 2010). One way to control is to adopt the 
matching approach employed by Gomez and Santor (2003) in the context of microfinance. Instead of 
correcting the self-selection bias corresponding to the contract type, we report non-corrected results with 
explanatory variables in groups 2 and 4 only (subsection 4.2.1). The motivation of this exercise is to 
capture the net effects on repayment, including the causal effects of contract design and selection effects. 
This specification is informative in characterizing the problems that occurred under the old system. After 
controlling for the self-selection of contract type, we estimate a more reduced-form model with 
explanatory variables in groups 1, 3, and 4 only (subsection 4.2.2). In this specification, the choice of 
contract type is treated as endogenous so that variables in group 2 are excluded. 
4.2  Estimation  results 
4.2.1  Default/delay  and  credit  contract  design 
Table 3 reports estimation results with Default (dummy for borrower-level default) or Avg_delay 
(average delay in days in installment repayment by a borrower with Default = 0) as dependent variables. 
The explanatory variables are contract types, time effects, and union fixed effects. 
In the regression results for Default, the period of credit duration and the dummy for non-monthly 
installments show positive and statistically significant coefficients. For instance, in Model 1, the 
probability of default would be higher by 18.5% if the credit duration became six months longer and the 
probability would be higher by 20.8% if monthly installments were replaced by installments with a longer 
interval in between. The regression results for Avg_delay show a very strong effect of the dummy for 
non-monthly installments, indicating that the delay would be 84 days longer if monthly installments were 
replaced by installments with a longer interval. These results demonstrate the appropriateness of the 
reforms introduced in early 2005—making all installments monthly and reducing the maximum loan 
duration to 15 months. As predicted by the estimation results in Table 3, these reforms successfully 
reduced repayment delays, resulting in zero default rates under the new system (Table 2). The success of 
frequent repayment in minimizing default and delay has been seen in microfinance schemes worldwide, 
16 
 
             
     
             
       
         
         
       
   
   
 
   
 
 
         
       
 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
     
   
       
       
   
                                                       
 
     
       
   
and attributed to the early warning mechanism, the lender’s capture of non-microfinance income flow of 
the borrower, and the borrower’s commitment to save regularly (Aghion and Morduch, 2010). On the 
other hand, a recent study based on a randomized experiment in India by Field and Pande (2008) shows 
no differences between microfinance schemes with weekly and monthly repayment frequencies. 
Considering these findings in conjunction, it appears that monthly repayment is the optimal frequency 
that can be stipulated to avoid repayment delays and reduce the transaction costs of too frequent 
repayment. 
With regard to the coefficient on the dummy for loan size larger than Rs.15,000, the coefficient is 
negative, which is contrary to our expectations.
18  It is negative in all four models reported in Table 3, 
with the coefficient on Avg_delay being statistically significant. This appears to reflect selection bias. 
Only those borrowers with characteristics associated with higher probability of on-time repayment 
applied for and were granted large loans. Given the strong selection effect, the potential negative effect of 
loan size on repayment cannot be observed in Table 3. 
Significantly positive coefficients of the period of credit duration and the dummy for 
non-monthly installments could also reflect selection effects. The regression results show that loans with 
longer repayment periods and fewer installments are detrimental to repayment because of the negative 
causal effects on repayment behavior and the selection effect of such contracts attracting more risky 
borrowers. 
In all specifications, both union fixed effects and time effects are jointly significant at the 1% 
level. It is not qualitatively important whether the time effects are controlled by D_issue and its 
higher-order polynomials or by year dummies (compare Models 1 and 2 in Table 3). This applies to other 
regression results as well. Therefore, the tables below report only the estimation results using D_issue and 
its higher-order polynomials. 
4.2.2  Default/delay  and  borrowers’  characteristics 
As a more reduced-form approach, Default or Avg_delay is regressed on explanatory variables, 
including borrowers’ individual characteristics, borrower households’ characteristics, CO characteristics, 
and location and time effects (Table 4). The explanatory variables are jointly significant and those with 
individual statistical significance show expected signs. The results are summarized in four observations. 
First, borrowers who reported their NIC information and female borrowers were less likely to 
default. When female borrowers repaid their loans, they did so on time. The finding of the higher 
18We employ this variable instead of loan size for two reasons. First, loan size is highly correlated with loan 
duration. Therefore, to avoid the multicollinearity problem, we employ this dummy variable. Second, as part of 2005 
reforms, the issue of loan contracts larger than Rs.15,000 was stopped. This dummy variable is used to examine the 




     
     
         
         
     
   
   
 
         
   
     
             
       
     
 
 
     
   
       
   
     
     
       
         
     
     
                                                       
     
   
         
         
   
repayment rate by female borrowers is consistent with those of other empirical studies on microfinance in 
South Asia (Aghion and Morduch, 2010). This may reflect difference in preferences and alternative 
sources of credit availability. The result pertaining to NIC information shows that NIC information made 
it more difficult for a defaulting borrower to re-apply for a loan in the future. In other words, this shows 
that the enforcement of the contingent renewal rule was imperfect under the old system. The dummy for 
chairman or secretary of the CO has a negative coefficient, which is as expected since such borrowers are 
more credible; however, the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
Second, to control the resource availability of a borrower, several household-level variables 
characterizing household income sources are included and all of them have significant coefficients. 
Households with more income sources and households with income originating outside their residential 
areas were less likely to default, and when borrowers from these households repaid loans, they did so on 
time. This shows the importance of income diversification in avoiding default. 
The third observation is that the dummy variable for a female-headed household has a negative 
coefficient and that coefficient is statistically significant for the Default regression. If this variable mainly 
captures the income and wealth effects, we expect the opposite sign since female-headed households in 
Pakistan tend to be poorer than male-headed households. The negative coefficient implies that 
female-headed households have fewer alternative credit sources because of which they tend to default 
less. 
Last, several variables characterizing the CO to which the borrower belonged have significant 
effects on repayment. COs’ savings have a negative coefficient, implying that either the savings 
accumulated at the CO serves as a buffer against default or borrowers in COs with higher savings tend to 
be safer investors. COs with incomplete records were more likely to default. The age of the CO at the 
time when the loan was issued has a positive coefficient, suggesting that older COs were less successful at 
repayment, which in turn points to group fatigue (Sharma and Zeller, 1997). Among the CO 
characteristics, the number of CO members has a positive coefficient and it is statistically significant in 
the Avg_delay regression. We attribute this result to the difficulty faced by larger COs in coordinating 
within the group and to the need to avoid the free rider problem.
19 
The regression results in Table 4 thus appear to indicate a limited role played by COs in 
preventing default and repayment delays; instead, our field observations indicate that COs functioned as a 
collusive forum that was counterproductive under the old system. This inference will be further 
19In a different context in Pakistan, Kurosaki (2005) reports a positive effect of the size and diversity of a 
community-based organization (CBO) on the level of collective action. His interpretation is that while larger and 
more diverse CBOs may face difficulty in coordinating within the group and avoiding the free rider problem, the 
advantage they enjoy in terms of technical skills required for the particular type of collective action he analyzes 








     
       
 
       
 
     
   
   
     
     
       
   
     
       
     
   
           
         
 
     
         
       
   
     
     
   
       
investigated in the next section. 
5  Repayment Dynamics and Intra-Group Interactions under the Failed 
System: An Installment-Level Analysis 
5.1  Example 
Figure 7 plots the pattern of repayment for five sample borrowers who belonged to the same CO 
and borrowed under the same conditions. They borrowed Rs.20,000 on November 7, 2000, which was to 
be repaid in 18 monthly installments after a grace period of one month. In the figure, the cumulative 
amounts of repayment are plotted for the borrowers, and the scheduled repayment is traced in a blue line 
with solid diamond dots. For each borrower, a marker on the curve represents the cumulative amount 
repaid at that date. 
If the curve lies below the scheduled line, it implies a delay in repayment. The figure shows that 
borrowers 401, 403, and 405 made delayed repayments, while borrowers 402 and 404 paid before the due 
date (Avg_delay for these two borrowers is negative). If a curve plateaus before reaching the level of 
Rs.23,490 (the total amount that should be repaid), it implies that the loan was defaulted. From the figure, 
borrowers 401, 403, and 405 can be said to have defaulted (Default for these three borrowers is 1; hence, 
Avg_delay is not defined). Borrower 405 repaid the amounts corresponding to the first ten installments, 
although the repayments were delayed. Therefore, the installment-level variables for borrower 405 for the 
first ten installments are calculated as No_repay = 0 and Delay > 0, and for the last eight installments as 
No_repay = 1 and thereby Delay is not defined for the last eight installments for borrower 405. 
Figure 7 provides two interesting insights. First, borrowers with repayment problems have linear 
or slightly concave curves. This implies that once a borrower makes a delayed repayment, it becomes 
difficult for him/her to catch up with the scheduled repayment by the next installment; instead, it is more 
likely that the borrower will be delayed again by a similar or longer margin. In other words, Delay 
appears to be positively auto-correlated. 
Second, the curves for some of the borrowers closely resemble each other. When borrower 402 
repaid more than the required amount for the third installment, borrower 404 followed suit. Further, 
borrowers 401 and 405 missed the first two due dates but paid the amount due for one installment on the 
due date of the third installment, and while they repaid some amount when the fourth installment was due, 
it was not enough to clear their outstanding dues. In other words, Delay appears to be positively 
correlated among the CO members (we call this peer correlation). 
Since members of a CO reside in the same village, they are subject to village-level covariate 
shocks. If it can be shown that borrowers 401 and 405 (or borrowers 402 and 404) have suffered from 
such covariate negative shocks, peer correlation between them is expected. It is expected that 
19 
 
     
 
   
         
 
   
           
 
   
     
             
       
   
 
 
      
     
 
       
     
   
   
     
         
   
   
 
         
             
 
   
         
 
microenterprise project returns are more correlated if borrowers invest in similar investments. However, 
the actual investments do not match our expectations: borrower 402 invested in a small grocery shop, 
while borrower 404 invested in buffaloes; further, borrower 401 invested in buffaloes, while borrower 
405 invested in a small grocery shop. Therefore, it is difficult to explain the observed peer correlation by 
village-level covariate shocks. 
By analyzing more cases and holding discussions with program participants and MFI officers in 
the field, we infer that the mismatch mentioned above may be reflective of a kind of strategic default. 
Because the dynamic incentives were weak under the old system, if one group member was hit by a 
negative shock and faced difficulty in repayment, the other members who were able to repay might have 
decided to default themselves as well, instead of helping the unlucky person make his/her repayment. As 
mentioned in Section 2, the peer correlation coefficient should be 1 if joint liability is perfectly enforced, 
and less than 1 under imperfect joint liability. The value of the coefficient increases with the frequency of 
strategic default. Using our detailed dataset at the installment level, we investigate whether this 
hypothesis is supported empirically. 
5.2  Empirical  strategy 
We begin with an installment-level model for Delay, because most cases of No_repay = 1 occur 
after several instances of repayment delay. By definition, for each borrower, the variable No_repay 
switches only once from zero to one, after which, it continues to take the value of one. Therefore, after 
analyzing the determinants of Delay, we analyze the determinants of transition probability from No_repay 
= 0 to No_repay = 1. 
To focus on the installment-level dynamics and to avoid additional complications caused by 
differences in repayment schedules, we use the subset of our installment-level data with 18 monthly 
installments. Out of 36,777 installments under the old system (see Table 2), 17,316 installments comprise 
the subset used in the analysis below. A larger subset is used in the robustness check. Each credit contract 
is denoted by subscript i and the order of its monthly installment is denoted by subscript t (t = 1, 2,…, 18). 
The following model is estimated to investigate the determinants of Delayit: 
Delayit = a1Delayi,t-1 + a2Delay
C
it + ui + ut + eit, (1) 
where Delay
C
it is the average over j of Delayjt where j is a member of the CO to which borrower i belongs 
and is a borrower whose due falls on the same date as borrower i’s due. In calculating Delay
C
it, borrower i 
is excluded to avoid the spurious correlation between Delayit and Delay
C
it due to construction. This 
variable captures the extent of peer correlation. ui is a borrower-specific unobservable factor, ut is an 
unobservable factor specific to the installment order, eit  is an independently identically distributed (iid) 
error term, and a1 and a2 are parameters to be estimated. 
20 
 
   
     
 
           
   
         
   
       
 
     
  
 
   
   
   
   
 
       
       
       
         
   
     
     
         
   
 
   
 
Equation (1) is estimated by a two-way fixed effect (FE) panel regression model, with individual 
credit contract as “group” and the installment number as “time” for the FE specification. The 
borrower-level determinants of repayment such as gender, NIC information, income sources, CO 
characteristics, and others, which have already been investigated in the previous section, are jointly 
controlled by  ui. In addition, ui controls the macroeconomic factors because each credit contract is 
associated with the date of the credit issue so that the i-fixed effect controls unobserved factors associated 
with the date. The common dynamics in a repayment cycle (e.g., a borrower may have a higher 
motivation to repay on time for the first and the last installment, but may have lower motivations for 
payment of installments in between) is controlled by ut. 
Since Delay
C
it  does not reflect the information of No_repayjt, a variant of equation (1) is also 
estimated: 
Delayit = a1Delayi,t-1 + a2Problem
C
it + ui + ut + eit, (2) 
where Problem
C
it is defined in a way similar to Delay
C
it, but using Problemjt (dummy for non-repayment 
until 31 days after the due date; see Table 2). To investigate the determinants of transition probability 
from  No_repay=0 to No_repay=1, we compile a variable No_repay
C
it, which is calculated from 
No_repayjt in a way similar to Delay
C
it. We then estimate the following equation for the subsample with 
No_repayi,t-1=0: 
No_repayit = a1Delayi,t-1 + a2No_repay
C
it + ui + ut + eit. (3) 
Equations (2) and (3) are also estimated by a two-way FE model, with individual credit contract 
as group and the installment number as time. In all three equations, parameter a1 captures the extent of 
auto correlation, and parameter a2 captures the extent of peer correlation. The robustness of our results to 
other econometric specifications is discussed in a separate subsection. 
If the estimate for a2 is significantly positive, it implies the existence of peer correlation, which is 
consistent with the predictions of the imperfect joint liability model discussed in the theoretical section. It 
is possible, however, that peer correlation simply reflects the ill-effects of covariate shocks that hit 
microenterprise projects run by microcredit borrowers. To examine this possibility, we divide the sample 
observations into those belonging to a CO with very homogeneous microenterprise projects and those 
belonging to a CO with heterogeneous microenterprise projects. If the main reason for the significance of 
a2 is the covariance of microenterprise project returns, we expect the estimate for a2 among homogeneous 
groups to be larger than that among heterogeneous groups. If the estimate for a2 is similar for both groups, 
we interpret that peer correlation stems mainly from strategic default under imperfect joint liability. 




         
       
       
   
 
 
         
   
       
           
 
     
       
         
         
         
   
         
 
       
         
 
     
       
     
       
       
     
     
                                                       
   
   
 
for the same project purpose.
20  It is an indicator of the homogeneity of microenterprise projects. If 
Homogeneity = 1, the borrowers are presumably subject to greater covariate risk in microenterprises than 
if Homogeneity = 0. We split the sample on the basis of Homogeneity and estimate equations (1), (2), and 
(3) using smaller subsamples. We then compare the estimates for a2, testing the statistical significance of 
the difference using regression based on the pooled sample with a full set of cross-terms of explanatory 
variables with Homogeneity. 
5.3  Estimation  results 
The FE estimation results for equations (1), (2), and (3) are reported in Table 5. Coefficient a1 on 
Delayi,t-1 is positive and statistically significant in all three equations. Therefore, the existence of 
auto-correlation in repayment delay is confirmed quantitatively. The size of the coefficient in equations 
(1) and (2) is smaller than unity with statistical significance at the 1% level, allowing us to conclude that 
the dynamic path is stable. 
Coefficient a2 on the peer-average variable is also positive and significant in all three equations. 
This means that peer correlation exists. The size of these coefficients is rather large. A 10-day delay 
among the peers led to a delay of 3.19 days; a 10 percentage-point increase in the number of non-repaying 
borrowers until 31 days after the due date led to a delay of 3.06 days; and a 10 percentage-point increase 
in the number of fellow borrowers with No_repay = 1 increased the probability for a borrower to reach 
the status of No_repay = 1 by 4.89 percentage points. 
The regression results thus confirm the existence of strong auto- and peer correlation. The size of 
the peer correlation parameter can indicate the upper limit of the positive correlation among borrowers 
who delay/default owing to covariate shocks. To examine the extent to which the positive peer correlation 
can be attributed to strategic default, we split the sample by the value of Homogeneity and re-estimate 
equations (1), (2), and (3) using the smaller subsamples. 
The summary regression results in Table 6 show that the estimates for a2 are statistically 
significant in all specifications and their coefficients are very similar regardless of the choice of the 
sample. Coefficient a2 in equation (1) is 0.320 for heterogeneous COs where some members invested in 
projects different from others, while it is 0.337 for homogeneous COs where all members invested in the 
same project. The difference is statistically insignificant. Similarly, the value of coefficient a2 in equation 
(2) is 29.7 for heterogeneous COs and 30.7 for homogeneous COs. The difference again is statistically 
insignificant. In the No_repay regression (equation (3)), a2 is 0.455 for heterogeneous COs and 0.526 for 
20To compile this variable, project purposes are classified into 34 categories. For instance, “Livestock” shown under 




   
       
     
   
     
 
           




         
     
     
       
     
     
             
       
   
 
   
   
   
     
     
   
   
 
           
   
   
   
homogeneous COs. Here, even though the difference is statistically significant, the absolute size of the 
difference is small enough for us to view the difference as economically insignificant. 
The results in Table 6 do not support the view that the observed peer correlation was mainly due 
to the covariate shocks that hit borrowers; instead, they appear to corroborate the view that strategic 
default was (at least partially) responsible for peer correlation. In Section 6 of this paper, we estimate 
equation (1) using installment-level data under the new system. The results in Table 10 show that the 
estimate for a2 in homogeneous COs is significantly larger than that for a2 in heterogeneous COs. Given 
this contrast, it is reasonable to infer that the results in Table 6 support the view that the strategic default 
under the imperfect joint liability was a serious problem under the old system. 
5.4  Robustness  check 
To check the robustness of the results in Table 6, we attempt four different specifications. First, 
instead of splitting the sample by Homogeneity, we compile the Herfindahl index for project purpose (the 
sum of shares squared) and add its cross-terms with the peer-average variables to the three equations. The 
Herfindahl index takes the maximum value of 1, and if all borrowers in a CO invest in different projects, 
the index takes the minimum value of 1/n, where n is the number of members. If peer correlation is 
attributable to covariate shocks to microenterprises, we expect the coefficient on the cross-term to be 
positive. The regression results, shown in the last block of rows of Table 7, do not support this 
expectation. The cross-term has a negative and insignificant coefficient when the dependent variable is 
Delayit, and a positive and marginally significant coefficient, but of an economically insignificant 
magnitude, when the dependent variable is No_repayit. 
Second, instead of limiting the sample to observations associated with 18 monthly installments, 
we employ a larger subset of observations associated with more than 5 monthly installments. Out of 
36,777 installments under the old system (see Table 2), 36,306 installments are now included. The 
analysis may suffer from specification errors due to differences in repayment schedules, but it can gain in 
statistical efficiency from a larger number of observations. The results in Table 7 show qualitatively the 
same results as those in Table 6: Coefficient a2 is slightly larger when observations associated with 
homogeneous COs are used than when those associated with heterogeneous COs are used, but the 
difference is not economically significant. The statistical significance level improved in the case of 
equation (1), possibly reflecting the larger number of observations used, but it deteriorated in the case of 
equation (3). 
Third, we re-estimate equations (1) and (2) using the system generalized method of moments 
(GMM) approach proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). In these two equations, the lagged variable 
Delayi,t-1 is included in the right-hand-side, creating a dynamic panel data (DPD) structure. To avoid the 
23 
 
       
         
         
     
           
   
 
 
   
         
         
   
     
       
   
         
       
       
         
       
     
   
       
       





     
     
 
potential endogeneity bias caused by the DPD structure, we employ the system GMM estimation method. 
The system GMM results in Table 7 show that coefficient a2 is smaller (not larger) when observations 
associated with homogeneous COs are used than when those associated with heterogeneous COs are used, 
and the difference is statistically significant. Although a clear inference does not emerge from the results, 
it is beyond doubt that they do not support the view that the observed peer correlation was mainly due to 
covariate shocks that hit borrowers’ microenterprises. 
Fourth, considering the possibility of the reflection problem (Manski, 1993), we re-estimate the 
three equations using instrumental variable specifications, treating the peer-average variables as 














i,t-1) and the lagged value of a variable proxying union-level repayment 
problems.
21  The regression results in Table 7 show that the extent of peer correlation is reduced and the 
difference in a2  across the two subsamples distinguished by Homogeneity is insignificant in all three 
equations. This re-confirms the view that strategic default contributed to peer correlation. 
In addition to conducting the robustness checks reported in Table 7, we re-estimate the model 
using Delay as the dependent variable after re-defining it as truncated at zero for payments made earlier 
than their due dates. This is because early payments do not damage MFIs. We also re-estimate the 
instrumental variable specification using two-period lags as the instrumental variables, considering the 
possibility that a borrower watches not only his/her peer’s contemporary behavior but also his/her peer’s 
one-time lagged behavior when deciding on the repayment decision. The results are qualitatively the same 
as those reported so far.
22  These results prove that a borrower’s repayment delay for an installment is 
correlated with other members’ repayment delays beyond the level explained by a possible correlation of 
project failures owing to locally covariate shocks. We therefore interpret this as evidence for the existence 
and seriousness of strategic default. Pakistani society historically has had limited experience with 
cooperative community-based development. It has been marked by the existence of strong local elites 
(e.g., see Kurosaki, 2005), which appears to underlie the limited success of community-based group 
lending. The following section investigates whether the system change in early 2005 can explain the 
relative success of the MFI under study. 
21The union-level repayment problem variable is defined as the fitted value of Problem
C on union fixed effects and
 
year-month fixed effects for the repayment due dates.





     
 
   
   




       
   
           
         
                 
           
   
   
   
     
     
     
       
       
       
     
 
   
   
   
 
   
   
     
 
6  Repayment Delays under the New System and Impact of the Earthquake 
6.1  Empirical  models 
6.1.1  Borrower-level  analysis 
Table 2 shows no case of Default = 1 or No_repay = 1 after the adoption of the new system in 
early 2005. Therefore, we first estimate the borrower-level determinants of Avg_delay for the 670 
borrowers who completed the repayment schedule, using a specification similar to the one reported in 
Table 4. 
Given the severity of the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, an observation of whether the natural 
calamity affected repayment patterns holds particular interest. To identify the earthquake impact, we 
adopt a standard difference-in-difference (DID) approach. First, we determine the distance between the 
borrower locality and the epicenter of the earthquake from the website of the Earthquake Reconstruction 
and Rehabilitation Agency (ERRA). We then create a dummy variable, D_eq, which takes the value of 1 
if the household is located within a radius of 75 km from the epicenter of the earthquake, and 0 otherwise. 
The threshold radius of 75 km is chosen after consultation with seismologists at Pakistan Meteorological 
Department. The robustness of empirical results with respect to the choice of D_eq is discussed later. 
To capture the possibility that repayment installments were adversely affected by the earthquake, 
we compile a borrower-level variable, Time_t1, which is the ratio of the number of installments due after 
the earthquake to the total number of installments. Variable D_eq captures the region-specific effect, 
while Time_t1 captures the effect of macroeconomic factors, so that their coefficients cannot be attributed 
to the earthquake. However, by adding D_eq*Time_t1, a cross-term for the two variables, we can identify 
the impact of the earthquake under the DID assumption that the region-specific effect affects only the 
base level of repayment delay, not its growth, and that the macroeconomic factors are homogeneous 
across regions. 
Similarly, to capture the possibility that borrowers who obtained credit after the earthquake had 
difficulty in timely repayment, we introduce another borrower-level variable, D_t2, which is a dummy for 
loans made after the earthquake. The cross term D_eq*D_t2 shows the impact of the earthquake under a 
similar identification assumption. Since Time_t1 and D_t2 are positively correlated (the correlation 
coefficient was 0.657), we estimate three specifications: use both Time_t1 and D_t2 (specification A), 
D_t2 only (specification B), and Time_t1 only (specification C). 
6.1.2  Installment-level  analysis 
To investigate the earthquake impact as well as the nature of peer correlation, we estimate an 
installment-level model corresponding to equation (1). To identify the earthquake impact under FE 
specifications, we compile an installment-level variable, D_t1, which is a dummy variable for 
25 
 
     
       
   
   
       
       
 
 
     
 
     
   
     
               
     
     
     
         
       
   
         
   
   
   
   
             
   
       
 
                                                       
         
 
       
   
installments due after the earthquake, and then include its cross term with D_eq. Under random effect 
(RE) specifications, we can add the borrower-level dummy variable D_t2, which is defined already, and 
its cross term with D_eq. 
The cross-terms show the causal effect of earthquake on repayment delay under the DID 
assumption mentioned above. By investigating the coefficients on D_eq*D_t1 (identified under both FE 
and RE specifications) and D_eq*D_t2 (identified under RE specifications only), we can thus identify the 
impact of the earthquake. 
6.2  Estimation results: Impact of the earthquake 
Table 8 reports the estimation results for the borrower-level determinants of Avg_delay using 670 
borrowers.
23  Among borrowers’ and CO’s characteristics, three variables have statistically significant 
coefficients. The effects of “Dummy for a female borrower” and “Number of income sources of the 
household” are significantly negative, indicating that female borrowers were more punctual in repayment 
and income diversification is beneficial for timely repayment. This is similar to our findings under the old 
system (Table 4). Contrary to expectation, “CO’s savings” has a significantly positive coefficient but this 
is not robust (see Table 9). 
The impact of the earthquake is marginally discernible through the coefficients on D_eq*D_t2. 
The borrower-average delay was 6.1 days longer as per specification A and 4.3 days longer as per 
specification B, if the borrower obtained the credit after the earthquake and he/she lived within a 75-km 
radius of the earthquake epicenter. The coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level. Because of 
the multicollinearity, we prefer the estimate under specification B. The point estimate of a delay of 4.3 
days is marginal if we compare it with repayment delays under the old system. 
Table 9 reports the estimation results for the installment-level determinants of Delay.
24 First, all 
variables capturing auto- and peer correlation have positive and statistically significant coefficients. 
Second, the impact of the earthquake is not discernible in the installment-level analyses. The coefficients 
on D_eq*D_t1 are insignificant in both models. The coefficient on D_eq*D_t2, which is identified in the 
RE specification only, is positive; however, its magnitude is extremely small and statistically insignificant. 
Third, most of the borrower-level variables, whose effects are identified only in the RE specification, are 
insignificant in explaining Delay, except for the female borrower dummy. 
Table 10 reports results of the examination of the robustness of marginal or insignificant effects 




24We use the subset of our installment-level data corresponding to observations with 12 monthly installments. Out
 




   
       
         
       
   
     
     
 
 
     
       
 
             
     




   
     
   
       
       
       
   
   
         




   
     
 
of the earthquake on repayment through different specifications. We obtain a positive (i.e., 
delay-increasing) and statistically significant coefficient on the cross-term D_eq*D_t2 only when we use 
the borrower-level regression models with D_eq, which is defined by a dummy variable associated with 
the threshold radius of 75 km. When we slightly change the value of the threshold radius (the definition of 
D_eq), the coefficients become insignificant or slightly negative. The coefficient on the cross-term 
D_eq*Time_t1 or D_eq*D_t1 is not significant. From the installment-level regressions, we are unable to 
find any positive and significant coefficient. Therefore, we conclude that the repayment delay was 
affected by the earthquake only marginally at best and the impact was not robust. 
6.3  Estimation results: Nature of peer correlation 
Regarding the nature of peer correlation, Table 9 shows that a2 (the coefficient capturing peer 
correlation) remains highly significant under the new system, as was the case under the old system (Table 
5). To investigate whether this means that the tendency to default strategically remains unaffected under 
the new system, we prepare Table 11, in which we examine whether a2 is higher among borrowers who 
choose similar projects within their borrowers’ group. 
When equation (1) is re-estimated with the sample split by Homogeneity, a striking result 
emerges: a2 is considerably larger when observations associated with homogeneous COs are used than 
when those associated with heterogeneous COs are used. The difference is not only statistically 
significant (the significance level is less than 0.1%), but also economically significant. The results under 
the default specification show that under the new system, coefficient a2 is 0.292 in COs where some 
members invested in projects different from those of the others, while it is 0.656 in COs where all 
members invested in the same project. 
In Table 11, we employ four types of robustness checks, as we did for the borrowers under the 
old system. When we identify the difference in COs’ heterogeneity using the Herfindahl index for project 
purposes (last block of rows in Table 11), the cross-term has a highly positive and statistically significant 
coefficient (the significance level is less than 0.1%). When a larger subsample is employed, the results are 
very similar to those under the default specification. When we re-estimate equation (1) using the system 
GMM approach, the coefficients become slightly smaller, although the test for the hypothesis that a2 is 
the same regardless of project homogeneity is rejected at the 0.1% level. When equation (1) is 
re-estimated with the peer-average Delay
C
it treated as endogenous,
25  peer correlation among the less 
homogeneous groups disappears while that among the more homogeneous groups remains positive and 
25Identifying instrumental variables are Delay
C
i,t-1 and the lagged value of the union-level repayment problem 
variable. The union-level repayment problem is defined as the fitted value of Delay
C
it  on union fixed effects and 
repayment-month fixed effects. 
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statistically significant at the 1% level. 
As done earlier, in addition to the robustness checks reported in Table 11, we re-estimate the 
model using Delay truncated at zero for the payments made earlier than their due dates, and the 
instrumental value specification using two-period lags as the identifying instrumental variables. The 
results are again qualitatively the same as those reported earlier in this section.
26 
These results confirm that the main reason for peer correlation in Delay under the new system is 
covariate shocks to microenterprises, and not strategic default. From our field observations, we received 
no indication that there occurred a substantial change in the covariance among microenterprises run by 
microcredit borrowers after early 2005. We therefore interpret this as evidence that the tendency to 
default strategically has reduced under the new system owing to improved dynamic incentives and more 
frequent repayment schedules. This interpretation is consistent with the prediction of our theoretical 
model in Section 2 that improvement in enforcement of the contingent renewal rule will result in lower 
default rates and a lower level of peer correlation due to the less frequent strategic default. 
7  Conclusion 
This paper analyzed an interesting case of microfinance in Pakistan in which an MFI successfully 
overcame the problem of frequent default by adopting a new system with strict enforcement of 
punishment against delayed repayments. We hypothesized that strategic default under the joint liability 
mechanism, which was encouraged by weak enforcement of dynamic incentives, was responsible for 
failure under the old system. Using a unique dataset of about 45,000 repayment installments covering 
2,945 micro-borrower households over the period 1998–2007, we investigated the dynamics of repayment 
at the installment level. We found that a borrower’s delay in the repayment of each installment was 
correlated with the repayment delays of other members in his/her group, beyond the level explained by 
possible correlation of project failures due to locally covariate shocks. Although peer correlation was 
evident under the new system as well, it was better explained by covariate shocks to microenterprises. 
Therefore, our interpretation is that strategic default occurred frequently and was a serious problem under 
the old system, while the new system was successful in suppressing collusion among group members. In 
terms of actual borrowers’ data (not experimental data), this finding lends empirical support to the 
burgeoning literature on microfinance that insists that individual lending schemes are likely to be superior 
to joint-liability schemes when they are accompanied by dynamic incentives and frequent repayment 
installments. 
Although the study area was hit by a disastrous earthquake in October 2005, the new 
26  The estimations results are available on request. 
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microfinance system was affected only marginally in terms of repayment delay. This does not necessarily 
imply that the earthquake did not pose any threat to MFIs; rather, it may reflect a change in the lending 
strategy in that the MFI became more selective about its clients and started monitoring borrowers more 
thoroughly, thereby undermining the gravity of the delay/default problem. As shown in Table 1, most 
borrowers’ observable characteristics did not change after the earthquake, except for the ratio of 
households with income originating outside their residential areas (21% before the earthquake and 100% 
after the earthquake). This suggests that after the earthquake, the MFI tended to lend only to those 
households with outside income in order to avoid repayment problems. If borrowers in the earthquake-hit 
region faced stricter selection or monitoring after the earthquake, then it can be said that they suffered not 
only on account of the natural disaster but also from the inflexible repayment requirements of MFI—an 
inference that is corroborated in a similar finding reported by Shoji (2010) in the case of floods in 
Bangladesh, 2004. The net impact of the earthquake on borrowers’ welfare is a topic that merits further 
investigation. 
A novel implication of these findings in the context of understanding microfinance pertains to the 
concept of covariate shocks. Even in cases where shocks to microenterprises caused by borrowers of the 
same group are purely idiosyncratic from the viewpoint of an individual borrower, their effect on MFIs 
may be similar to that of covariate shocks if the tendency to default strategically exists. This paper shows 
that widespread strategic default affects the sustainability of microfinance more adversely than a purely 
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31Table 1. Characteristics of Microfinance Loans 
New system 
Borrowers who  Borrowers 
Old system  borrowed  who borrowed 
before the  after the 
earthquake  earthquake 
Characteristics of credit 
First date of credit issued  01-May-98  02-Jan-05  16-Oct-05 
Last date of credit issued  04-Oct-03  08-Oct-05  08-Jul-06 
Amount of credit in Rs. 
Average  16,324  8,265  9,632 
(SD: standard deviation)  (9,427)  (2,384)  (2,945) 
Minimum  500  5,000  5,000 
Maximum  50,000  10,000  15,000 
Number of installments 
Average  16.17  11.90  12.42 
(SD)  (8.98)  (1.07)  (1.04) 
Minimum  1  1  1 2 
Maximum  30  12  15 
Credit duration in months 
Average  17.63  11.90  12.42 
(SD)  (7.99)  (1.07)  (1.04) 
Minimum  1  1  1 2 
Maximum  31  12  15 
Characteristics of borrowers 
Ratio of borrowers with NIC* information recorded  78.5%  100.0%  100.0% 
Ratio of female borrowers  24.2%  50.5%  47.9% 
Ratio of borrowers who are chairman or secretary of the CO  4.5%  18.0%  20.4% 
Average number of income sources of the household  1.62  3.16  2.97 
(SD)  (0.86)  (1.56)  (1.51) 
Ratio of borrowers who had income sources outside the region  18.5%  21.1%  100.0% 
Ratio of borrowers from female-headed households  8.0%  0.0%  13.9% 
Ratio of borrowers from joint families  47.6%  36.6%  20.4% 
Characteristics of COs (community organizations) 
Average CO's savings (in Rs.100000)#  0.173  0.056  0.041 
(SD)  (0.160)  (0.105)  (0.075) 
Average number of CO members#  36.0  24.3  22.1 
(SD)  (12.4)  (9.0)  (8.2) 
Ratio of COs with missing CO records#  0.165  0.032  0.014 
Average CO's age in days at the time of loan issue  496.1  1204.2  1234.4 
(SD)  (418.3)  (627.0)  (740.2) 
Purpose of borrowing (total=100%) 
Agricultural crop  5.3%  0.3%  0.3% 
Livestock  61.4%  6.9%  6.8% 
Shops, business, workshops  30.4%  52.1%  58.1% 
Others  0.6%  0.6%  0.9% 
Domestic needs (consumption, education, housing, etc.)  2.3%  40.1%  34.0% 
Number of sample borrowers  2275  317  353 
Notes *: NIC stands for the "National Identity Card" issued by the Government of Pakistan.
 # "Savings" and "Number of CO members" were not reported for some of the sample COs under the old 
system. The reported averages consider only those COs with complete information. 
32Table 2. Defaults and Delays in Repayment of Microcredit 
New system 
Borrowers who 






Total number of observations  2275  317  353 
Default (dummy for non-repayment) 
NOB: Number of observations for which this variable 
can be defined  2275  317  353 
Average (ratio of defaults)  0.5081  0  0 
Avg_delay (average delay in repayment) 
NOB  1119  317  353 
Average (in days)  100.0  -1.3  2.1 
SD  144.8  12.6  10.7 
Minimum  -552.0  -93.8  -68.7 
Maximum  1014.0  15.9  21.1 
Installment-level variables 
Total number of observations  36777  3771  4383 
No_repay (dummy for non-repayment) 
NOB  36777  3771  4383 
Average (ratio of non-repayments)  0.2078  0  0 
Delay (delay in repayment) 
NOB  29134  3771  4383 
Average (in days)  101.1  -1.4  2.3 
SD  176.1  18.8  16.1 
Minimum  -552  -249  -208 
Maximum  1560  28  77 
Problem (dummy for non-repayment until 31 days after 
the due date) 
NOB  36777  3771  4383 
Average  0.6549  0.0000  0.0046 
33Table 3. Borrower-level Defaults/Delays and Credit Contract Types 
Probit: Default  Two-stage Heckman: 
Avg  delay 
Coef.  dF/dx  Coef. 
Model 1 
Dummy for loan size larger than Rs.15,000  -0.0182  -0.0073  -24.19 * 
(0.0952)  (12.76) 
Credit duration in months  0.0774 ***  0.0309  0.63 
(0.0072)  (1.01) 
Dummy for non-monthly installments  0.5414 ***  0.2079  84.16 *** 
(0.1340)  (18.83) 
Inverse Mills ratio  53.09 *** 
(16.31) 
Union fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Date of credit issued: linear, quadratic, cubic, quartic  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations used in the estimation  2275  1119/2275 
chi2(16), chi2(26) for zero slope  394.5  ***  408.0 *** 
Pseudo R2  0.1251 
Model 2 
Dummy for loan size larger than Rs.15,000  -0.0403  -0.0161  -31.46 ** 
(0.1007)  (13.03) 
Credit duration in months  0.0697 ***  0.0278  0.57 
(0.0072)  (1.02) 
Dummy for non-monthly installments  0.3639 **  0.1424  74.29 *** 
(0.1523)  (20.32) 
Inverse Mills ratio  48.04 *** 
(17.50) 
Union fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations used in the estimation  2275  1119/2275 
chi2(17), chi2(31) for zero slope  443.2  ***  448.2 *** 
Pseudo R2  0.1406 
Notes: (1) The average of "Dummy for loan size larger than Rs.15,000" is 0.592 and that of "Dummy for non-monthly 
installments" is 0.129. For other variables, see Tables 1 and 2 for summary statistics. 
(2) Coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. 
(3) For the two-stage Heckman estimation, the first-stage model is the one reported in Table 4 for Default using 2275 
observations. In other words, borrowers' and COs' characteristics are used as identifying instrumental variables. The 
number of uncensored observations is 1119. 





Coef.  dF/dx 
Borrowers' individual characteristics 
Dummy for the availability of NIC information  -0.6548 ***  -0.2513  -142.41 *** 
(0.0901)  (36.15) 
Dummy for a female borrower  -0.4779 ***  -0.1879  -78.40 *** 
(0.0772)  (25.86) 
Dummy forCO chairman or secretary  -0.1922  -0.0764  -3.52 
(0.1383)  (26.72) 
Borrower households' characteristics 
Number of income sources of the household  -0.3898 ***  -0.1555  -49.82 *** 
(0.0464)  (17.32) 
Dummy for income sources outside the region  -0.3664 ***  -0.1447  -47.51 * 
(0.1154)  (27.49) 
Dummy for a female-headed household  -0.8122 ***  -0.3004  -7.66 
(0.1757)  (49.25) 
Dummy for a joint family  -0.0632  -0.0252  19.76 
(0.0714)  (14.72) 
CO characteristics 
CO's savings (in Rs.100000)#  -0.4560 *  -0.1818  -40.51 
(0.2430)  (51.90) 
Number of CO members#  0.0010  0.0004  1.57 *** 
(0.0027)  (0.51) 
Dummy for missing CO records#  0.2393 **  0.0948  29.48 
(0.1026)  (23.74) 
CO's age in days at the time of loan issue  0.00064 ***  0.00026  0.080 ** 
(0.00010)  (0.038) 
Inverse Mills ratio  -212.31 ** 
(82.86) 
Union fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Date of credit issued: linear, quadratic, cubic, quartic  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations used in the estimation  2275  1119/2275 
chi2(26), chi2(49) for zero slope  531.4  ***  603.2 *** 
Pseudo R2  0.1685 
Notes: (1) # "Savings" and "Number of CO members" were not reported for approximately 15% of the sample 
COs. In such a case, "Dummy for missing CO records" takes the value of one, and the means of CO's savings 
and the number of members are included. The reported standard deviations for "Savings" and "Number of CO 
members" are based on the subsample for which these two variables were available. 
(2) Coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
(3) For the two-stage Heckman estimation, the first-stage model is the one reported in this table for Default . In 
other words, the model is identified only through the non-linearity of the inverse Mills ratio. 
35Table 5. Installment-level Dynamics of Delays and Defaults 
Determinants of Delay  Probability of transition 
from No_repay =0 to 
Equation (1)  Equation (2)  No_repay =1: Equation 
(3) 
Lagged value of Delay : Parameter a 1  0.736 ***  0.842 ***  0.00019 *** 
(0.007)  (0.006)  (0.00001) 
Peer effects: Parameter a 2 
Peer average of Delay  0.319 *** 
(0.008) 
Peer average of Problem  30.571 *** 
(2.133) 
Peer average of No_repay  0.4886 *** 
(0.0091) 
Total number of observations  12630  12630  13092 
Total number of borrowers  898  898  917 
R2 within  0.712  0.681  0.260 
R2 between  0.914  0.946  0.384 
R2 overall  0.817  0.813  0.219 
F-statistics for zero slope  1607.88 ***  1389.62 ***  237.02 *** 
F-statistics for all u i =0  2.48 ***  1.88 ***  2.39 *** 
F-statistics for all u t =0  1.35  5.57 ***  2.21 *** 
Notes: (1) All three models are estimated by a two-way fixed effect panel regression model, with individual credit 
contract as "group" and the installment number as "time" for the fixed effect. 
(2) F-statistics for zero slope have degrees of freedom (dof) at F(18,11714) for the determinants of Delay and 
F(18,12157) for the probability of transition. F-statistics for all u i =0 have dof at F(897, 11714) for the determinants 
of Delay and F(916,12157) for the probability of transition. F-statistics for all u t =0 have dof at F(16, 11714) for 
the determinants of Delay and F(16,12157) for the probability of transition. 
(3) Coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. 
(4) The subsample of installment-level data of borrowers associated with 18 monthly installments is used. 
36Table 6. Installment-level Peer Effects and Homogeneity of Microenterprise Projects 
Coefficient a 2 (extent of peer correlation) or its difference 
(addition for homogeneous groups) 
Separate regression results using two  Regression 
subsamples  results using 
pooled sample
Borrowers in a CO  Borrowers in a CO  with cross-terms
with less  with more  of all explanatory
homogeneous  homogeneous  variables with
projects  projects  Homogeneity
(Homogeneity =0)  (Homogeneity =1) 
Delay on Delay 
C (equation (1))  0.320 ***  0.337 ***  0.018 
(0.011)  (0.013)  (0.019) 
Delay on Problem 
C (equation (2))  29.684 ***  30.706 ***  1.022 
(2.788)  (3.126)  (4.591) 
No_repay on No_repay 
C (equation (3))  0.455 ***  0.526 ***  0.071  *** 
(0.012)  (0.015)  (0.019) 
Number of observations  8493  4137  12630 
Notes: (1) All nine models are estimated by a two-way fixed effect panel regression model, similar to the one in Table 
5. 
(2) Coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. 
37Table 7. Robustness of the Estimation Results Regarding Peer Effects 
Coefficient a 2 (extent of peer  Test for the 
correlation)  hypothesis 
Less  More  that a 2 is 
homogeneous  homogenous  the same# 
Split the sample by dummy variable Homogeneity  Homogeneity =0 Homogeneity =1 
0. Default (see Table 6) 
Delay on Delay 
C (equation (1))  0.320  0.337  n.s. 
Delay on Problem 
C (equation (2))  29.684  30.706  n.s. 
No_repay on No_repay 
C (equation (3))  0.455  0.526  *** 
1. Larger sample whose installment number is more than 5 
Delay on Delay 
C (equation (1))  0.318  0.331  * 
Delay on Problem 
C (equation (2))  30.456  33.989  n.s. 
No_repay on No_repay 
C (equation (3))  0.459  0.471  ** 
2. System-GMM estimates treating lagged Delay as endogenous 
Delay on Delay 
C (equation (1))  0.250  0.209  (**) 
Delay on Problem 
C (equation (2))  128.613  79.677  (**) 
3. Instrumental variable estimates treating peer variables as endogenous 
Delay on Delay 
C (equation (1))  0.094  0.103  n.s. 
Delay on Problem 
C (equation (2))  10.522  -3.940  (n.s.) 
No_repay on No_repay 
C (equation (3))  0.214  0.204  (n.s.) 
4. Cross-term with Herfindahl to identify the difference in a 2  Linear term  Cross-term 
Delay on Delay 
C (equation (1))  0.338  -0.021  (n.s.) 
Delay on Problem 
C (equation (2))  30.832  -1.223  (n.s.) 
No_repay on No_repay 
C (equation (3))  0.379  0.146  * 
Notes: All models include the lagged value of delay, borrower fixed effects, and time controls (time fixed effects for 
cases 1, 3, and 4) as explanatory variables in addition to the peer variable. 
Case 1: The total number of observations is 25818 (equation (1) or (2)) and 26787 (equation (3)). The total number of 
borrowers is 1836 (equation (1) or (2)) and 1881 (equation (3)). 
Case 2: Estimated by the system-GMM method proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). Because of memory problem, 
the full list of time fixed effects were not included. Instead, the relative position of the installment and its higher order 
polynomials (to the fourth order) were included. This replacement did not affect the structural parameters for cases 1 
and 2 reported in this table. In all specifications, Hansen's J test indicates that the overidentifying restrictions implied 
by this GMM procedure are not rejected. The AR(2) test for autocorrelation of order 2 indicates that the null hypothesis 
of no autocorrelation is not rejected. 
Case 3: In the instrumental variable estimates, to avoid the simultaneity bias within a borrowers' group, the lagged 
values of the peer variables and the union-level shock indicators are employed as identifying instrumental variables for 
the peer variables. 
Case 4: Coefficient in the first column shows the one corresponding to the mean level of Herfindahl . Coefficient in the 
second column shows the one on the cross-term. The average of Herfindahl is 0.697 and its standard deviation is 0.297. 
# The null hypothesis is rejected at 1%=***, 5%=**, 10%=*, and not rejected at 10%="n.s." When a 2 is larger in 
homogeneous COs than in heterogeneous COs, these are shown without parentheses; when a 2 is smaller in 
homogeneous COs, these are shown in parentheses. 







Controls to identify the earthquake impact 
D_eq : Dummy for location close to the epicenter 
Time_t 1: Ratio of installments due after the earthquake 
D_eq * Time_t 1: Cross-term to identify the earthquake impact 
D_t 2: Dummy for the loan made after the earthquake 
D_eq * D_t 2: Cross-term to identify the earthquake impact 























Dummy for a female borrower 
Dummy for CO chairman or secretary 













Number of income sources of the household  -1.265 ***  -1.306 ***  -1.291 *** 
Dummy for income sources outside the region 

















CO's savings (in Rs.100000) 










CO's age in days at the time of loan issue 













Date of credit issued: linear, quadratic, cubic, quartic 















Notes: Estimated by OLS. 
(1) The dependent variable is Avg_delay . See Table 2 for its summary statistics. See Table 1 for the summary statistics of the 
explanatory variables. 
(2) Coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
39Table 9. Installment-level Dynamics of Delays under the New System and the Impact of the Earthquake 
Fixed effect  Random effect 
(FE) estimation  (RE) estimation 
Controls to identify the earthquake impact 
D_eq  0.276 
(0.751) 
D_t 1: Dummy for an installment due after the quake  -0.060  -0.259 
(0.670)  (0.598) 
D_eq * D_t 1  -0.367  -0.235 
(0.907)  (0.831) 
D_t 2: Dummy for the loan made after the earthquake  0.195 
(0.454) 
D_eq * D_t 2  0.021 
(0.508) 
Own and peer effects 
Lagged value of Delay  0.819 ***  0.983 *** 
(0.010)  (0.008) 
Peer average of Delay  0.375 ***  0.233 *** 
(0.012)  (0.009) 
Borrowers' characteristics 
Dummy for a female borrower  -0.549 ** 
(0.263) 
Dummy for CO chairman or secretary  0.062 
(0.285) 
Number of income sources of the household  0.095 
(0.077) 
Dummy for income sources outside the region  1.948 
(1.272) 
CO's savings (in Rs.100000)  2.181 
(1.524) 
Number of CO members  0.004 
(0.015) 
CO's age in days at the time of loan issue  -0.0003 
(0.0002) 
Total number of observations  6787  6787 
Total number of borrowers  617  617 
R2 within  0.622  0.609 
R2 between  0.891  0.947 
R2 overall  0.745  0.760 
Statistics for zero slope  722.49 ***  21350.79 *** 
F-statistics for all u i =0  2.09 *** 
Statistics for all u t =0  16.59 ***  225.55 *** 
Notes: (1) Both models are estimated with individual borrower as a "group" for the fixed (random) effect and with 
the installment number as the fixed time effect. 
(2) The effects of borrower-level variables including D_eq , D_t 2 and D_eq*D_t 2 are identified in the random 
effect specifications only. 
(3) "Statistics for zero slope" are F(14,6156) and Gaussian Wald chi2(25). "F-statistics for all u i =0" are F(616, 
6156). "Statistics for all u t =0" are F(10,3105) and chi2(10). 
(4) The subsample of installment-level data of borrowers associated with 12 monthly installments is used. 
40Table 10. Robustness with Respect to the Earthquake Impact 
Specification A  Specification B  Specification C 
Borrower-level regression 
D_eq = dummy (distance < 75 km) 
D_eq * Time_t 1  -6.800  3.026 
(6.618)  (4.989) 
D_eq * D_t 2  6.092 **  4.339 ** 
(2.757)  (2.083) 
D_eq = dummy (distance < 70 km) 
D_eq * Time_t 1  -4.863  -8.894 
(7.665)  (5.476) 
D_eq * D_t 2  -2.670  -4.070 * 
(3.295)  (2.368) 
D_eq = dummy (distance < 80 km) 
D_eq * Time_t 1  3.986  5.353 
(8.790)  (6.085) 
D_eq * D_t 2  0.378  1.358 
(2.626)  (1.833) 
D_eq = 100/distance 
D_eq * Time_t 1  -4.091  -6.686 
(8.358)  (6.612) 
D_eq * D_t 2  -1.999  -2.929 
(3.292)  (2.629) 
Installment-level regression, FE specification: D_eq * D_t 1 
D_eq = dummy (distance < 75 km)  -0.367 
(0.907) 
D_eq = dummy (distance < 70 km)  -0.854 
(1.006) 
D_eq = dummy (distance < 80 km)  0.208 
(0.966) 
D_eq = 100/distance  -0.656 
(1.110) 
Installment-level regression, RE specification 
D_eq = dummy (distance < 75 km) 
D_eq * D_t 1  -0.235  -0.187 
(0.831)  (0.782) 
D_eq * D_t 2  0.021  -0.062 
(0.508)  (0.479) 
Notes: All models include the same set of explanatory variables that are shown in Table 8 
(borrower-level regression) or in Table 9 (installment-level regression). 
(2) Coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
41Table 11. Peer Effects and Homogeneity of Microenterprise Projects under the New System 
Coefficient a 2 (extent of peer  Test for the 





that a 2 is 
the same# 
Split the sample by the dummy variable Homogeneity 
0. Default 
Homogeneity =0 Homogeneity =1 
Delay on Delay 





1. Larger sample whose installment number is 12 or 15 
Delay on Delay 
C (equation (1))  0.298  0.530  *** 
(0 014)  (0.014)  (0 018)  (0.018) 
2. System-GMM estimates treating lagged Delay as endogenous 
Delay on Delay 
C (equation (1))  0.153  0.279  *** 
(0.021)  (0.012) 
3. Instrumental variable estimates treating peer variables as endogenous 
Delay on Delay 





4C  i  h  Hf  d  h l  id  if  h  diff  i 4. Cross-term with Herfindahl to identify the difference in a 2  L Linear term  C Cross-term 
Delay on Delay 
C (equation (1))  -0.048  0.695  *** 
(0.031)  (0.046) 
Notes: All models include the lagged value of delay and time controls (time fixed effects for cases 1, 3, and 4) as
 
explanatory variables in addition to the peer variable.
 









For cases 2, 3, 4, see notes in Table 7.
 
# Figures in paretheses shows standard errors. The null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level, which is denoted by ***.
 
In all cases, a 2 is larger among more homogeneous COs.
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43Figure 2. Equilibria Pattern and Project Returns: Individual Liability (γ = 0) 
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44Figure 3. Equilibria Pattern and Project Returns: Perfect Joint Liability (γ > 1/2) 
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45Figure 4. Equilibria Pattern and Project Returns: Imperfect Joint Liability (γ < 1/2) 
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Notes: # We assume that 1 – r/{πp(θ1)} < γ < 1/2. Otherwise, {n, (c, IR)} is the equilibrium. 




46Figure 5. Equilibria Pattern and the Rule Enforcement Parameters 
 
 
  γ 
          (joint  liability  rule) 
                  1  
                      A l w a y s     G R   r e g i o n  
           d e f a u l t    
      
 
    0 . 5    
    GR-IR  mixed  region 
        B   ·      · B’ 
                                A  
        ·     · A’ 
                   
      I R   r e g i o n  
        0        r/θ
max          1     π  
















































































































































































   
























































































Date of scheduled installments and actual repayment 
Schedule  #401  #402  #403  #404  #405 
2
0
0
0
/
1
0
/
3
1
2
0
0
1
/
0
2
/
0
8
2
0
0
2
/
0
6
/
2
3
2
0
0
2
/
1
0
/
0
1
 
49